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What does democracy require for the way in which the British 
withdrawal from the EU is decided, implemented and achieved?
✦	 Only Parliament can finally decide the terms on which Brexit is achieved. The 2016 
referendum provided a significant statement of popular support to leave the EU. But 
giving effect to this decision is a highly technical process that only Parliament can 
navigate successfully – because there cannot be a plebiscite on each sub-issue. 
Parliament is accountable only to the electorate. The composition of voters can 
change at the next election, and previous voters can also change their minds.
✦	 Cross-party co-operation and engagement are needed, especially in a hung 
parliament, as now. The full Brexit process will not be resolved by March 2019, 
but will take several more years, perhaps even multiple parliamentary terms. 
So it necessitates careful deliberation from all MPs and parties in Parliament. 
Parliamentary democracy ought to epitomise informed debate by elected 
representatives and the capacity to compromise on the best course of action.
✦	 Government must openly communicate with the public about the achievable 
outcomes and feasible timelines for Brexit. Acknowledging the complexity of the 
task can (re)build trust with negotiating partners, and build public recognition of 
the need for an extension to the time to negotiate a withdrawal agreement or a 
transition period.
✦	 A progressive, sectoral and methodical plan of law reform is needed, prioritising 
the rule of law. Separating the UK from the EU is a highly technical and challenging 
process of law reform. There is now no pre-EU/European Community law for the UK 
to rely upon, and people have built their lives and businesses on the certainty of 
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Many political and constitutional steps are needed in order for the UK to leave the 
European Union, after 45 years as a full member. Cumulatively they form one of the biggest 
constitutional changes in British history, and one dogged by intense controversy and 
disputes. Joelle Grogan examines how far the Brexit process can meet democratic criteria 
for such a momentous transition, or may fall short of these standards.
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the law of the last 40 years. Sensibly reforming the law to reflect the UK in a post-
Brexit era entails committing to prioritise legal certainty and accountability above 
expediency and ease of policy implementation. It will also require a well-resourced 
and enlarged civil service, with open and transparent consultation processes.
✦	 Robust accountability mechanisms are needed to scrutinise government decisions 
taken under the Brexit process. The 2016 referendum gave a mandate to withdraw 
as a member of the European Union, but not to radically change the foundations of 
the British legal system. Such delegated powers as are necessary to quickly address 
deficiencies in the law arising from Brexit must be balanced by effective and robust 
oversight mechanisms. This includes acknowledging the central duty of the judiciary to 
review these decisions so as to uphold parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.
✦	 The process must fully involve the devolved legislatures. Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted in the majority to remain, and the land border with the Republic of 
Ireland makes Brexit’s implementation of critical importance to Northern Ireland.  For 
both Scotland and Wales, the previous devolution legislation assigned all powers to 
the devolved Parliament or Assembly that were not reserved to the UK. Yet the May 
government’s Brexit process seems to involve two stages, in which all powers shift 
back to Westminster, and only then are devolved down – potentially breaching the 
previous constitutional understanding (see Chapter 5.6). Navigating this cannot be 
done by Westminster imposing a solution.
Brexit is in the eye of the beholder. The 2016 referendum result is seen by many Leavers as 
the ultimate expression of the popular will of the British people. But Remainers often picture 
it instead as the upshot of a poorly framed question put to an ill-informed, and under-
representative segment of the population – even the product of a ‘gerrymander’. In the 
context of such all or nothing Brexit paradigms, auditing the democratic legitimacy of Brexit 
is challenging. However, there are clear and manifest issues with regards to the process by 
which Brexit is accomplished, rather than the outcome and the decision itself.
Recent developments
Since the 2016 referendum, subsequent change of Prime Minister, and advent of a 
hung parliament in mid-2017 much has happened. There was hard-fought litigation on 
parliamentary sovereignty to trigger Article 50, and the government decision to go ahead 
began a two-year countdown. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act aims to solve the 
issues of the separation of the UK from the EU within two years of exit day (at the end 
of March 2019). Very little of any of these changes has directly addressed the issues 
immediately pertinent to the Brexit process.
The 2017 general election was called to ‘strengthen the mandate’ of the Conservatives in 
the EU negotiations and to provide certainty in the leadership for the Brexit process, and 
‘stability’ in government. In fact it resulted in a loss of both. While Brexit was a key election 
issue, neither of the top two parties engaged with each other on the detailed strategies to 
be pursued following the election. Both remained deeply divided on them throughout 2018 
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(see Chapter 3.1). Since the election, then, the only certainty has been uncertainty, with viable 
Brexit options evolving in ways that have made analysis of them one day obsolete the next. 
By March 2018, one year after the triggering of Article 50’s two-year timeline, there was a 
draft agreement with the EU, though with considerable differences remaining over key 
issues such as the Northern Ireland border, the process of dispute resolution, and at that 
stage little progress on a future UK-EU relationship (post transition). By early autumn 2018 
the Prime Minister had dragooned her Cabinet (after two key resignations) into accepting 
the ‘Chequers agreement’ plan for the UK to retain free trade in goods with the EU 
countries, but not in services – denounced by critics as a fudge. Whether this compromise 
would succeed against Tory backbench rebels or be accepted by the EU negotiators 
remained unclear at the time of writing, with the UK government also publishing papers 
outlining ‘a calamity’ if the UK should instead leave on a ‘no deal’ basis.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The electorate’s 2016 rejection of 
membership of the European Union is an 
assertion of the importance of national 
sovereignty, and the desire for national 
control over laws, especially the key issue of 
migration.
By respecting a slim majority vote in an 
advisory referendum, where the campaign 
itself was subject to criticism for the lack of 
informed debate and uncertain positions, 
the government is pursuing a mandate 
which is unclear in its terms, meaning or 
consequences. What national sovereignty 
concepts can mean in the contemporary 
world remains unclear.
In promptly following up the Brexit vote, 
the government shows democratic respect 
for the (narrow) majority result of the EU 
referendum.
One consequence of according so much 
weight to an unclear mandate is to weaken 
the power of Parliament. Open debate 
about the consequences of Brexit has 
been curtailed as MPs face a backlash 
by pro-Brexit media and politicians, 
whereby expressing any doubts about 
the consequences of Brexit is seen as an 
attempt to undermine the people’s verdict.
The rights of millions of EU and UK citizens 
are being devalued to ‘bargaining chips’ 
in negotiations between the EU and the 
UK. Such a debasement of the meaning of 
citizenship and individual rights is a violation 
of basic tenants of a democracy.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The long delays in developing any clear 
UK negotiating position, and its late arrival 
in summer 2018, mean that negotiations 
with the EU may come to an end without a 
deal having been achieved. Embracing the 
possibility of a ‘no deal Brexit’ is a failing in 
the withdrawal negotiation process, because 
the public cannot easily estimate what may 
follow the March 2019 deadline on this 
pathway.
Rare and unjustified public attacks on 
the judiciary by leading politicians and 
powerful media following the Miller decision 
are a concerning trend, one eroding the 
separation of powers and respect for the 
institutions of democracy.
Future opportunities Future threats
The Brexit process presents an 
unprecedented opportunity for large-scale 
legal reform over a broad range of areas. 
The flexibility that could arise from the 
separation from EU norms presents a very 
significant opportunity for new practices and 
policy to develop.
The May government’s proposed framework 
for legal separation from the EU and reform 
of UK law has significant flaws. It sacrificed 
certainty for speed by delegating broad and 
sweeping powers to government ministers 
– allowing them scope to change vast areas 
of law with little oversight or review from 
Parliament, which is undemocratic by nature 
and design.
Withdrawing from the European Union 
will result in the restitution of substantial 
legislative and administrative powers to 
national, regional and local governments. 
This presents an important potential 
opportunity for increasing decentralisation 
and devolution of power to the most 
appropriate level of government, those 
closest to citizens.
The division of powers returned from the 
European Union between the UK national 
government in Whitehall and devolved 
governments is likely to be determined by 
the Westminster Parliament. Yet the de facto 
‘legislative supremacy of government’ 
seems likely to increase further. In addition, 
concerns remain that more power will be 
centralised in Westminster, and the current 
powers of the devolved governments to act 
under EU law could be diminished (or even 
lost in some cases).
260 5. How democratic and effective is UK national government? 
Future opportunities Future threats
New bilateral relationships between the 
UK and other countries can be formed as 
the UK seeks to find new trading partners 
across the globe. Post-Brexit, there may be 
new demands for democratic input in the 
process of agreeing trade deals, where they 
have previously been within the prerogative 
power of the executive.
The Brexit process represents a threat to 
rights based on EU law, for example, relating 
to workers, consumers, animals and the 
environment. These rights may be vulnerable 
to repeal where it becomes politically 
expedient to do so.
Rights codified by the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights will not be converted 
into UK law, where they do not otherwise 
exist. The removal of robust remedies for the 
violation of rights systematically weakens 
current redress and remedy mechanisms 
against (ab)use of executive and legislative 
power.
Is the European Union (Withdrawal) Act undemocratic?
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is designed to deliver both the legal 
separation of the UK from the EU, but also a degree of legal certainty within the UK 
following Brexit. The process will:
1. repeal the European Communities Act 1972;
2. convert directly effective EU law into UK law; and
3. delegate significant powers to the executive to remedy or prevent deficiencies arising 
from the conversion of EU Law (a ‘Henry VIII’ power’).
The European Communities Act 1972 was the parliamentary act that previously (and until 
March 2019) gave effect and supremacy to EU law in the UK. It underlay a significant 
corpus of law in the UK by incorporating the acquis of EU membership, notably the EU 
Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, into British law. Repealing this Act 
without adequate transition mechanisms may result in a high degree of uncertainty about 
which law applies (or continues to apply), where and when. Many legal commentators have 
highlighted multiple concerns arising from the design of this process. The most significant 
issue relating to the democratic legitimacy of Brexit concerns the use of delegated 
powers by ministers. The EU (Withdrawal) Act delegates power to government ministers 
to create secondary legislation which will change, amend or remove retained EU-law on 
an unprecedented scope and scale. An estimated 800 to 1,000 statutory instruments have 
already been envisioned, but this is likely to be an underestimation of a possible ‘legislative 
tsunami’ that may result from this Act.
Constraints on the use of delegated powers to change or remove primary or secondary 
law are limited, while the power to determine where secondary legislation is needed is 
broad. Ministers will also decide the level of parliamentary scrutiny. Following criticisms in 
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the Commons and Lords during the Withdrawal bill debates, a compromise was agreed to 
create a ‘sifting committee’ of MPs who will scrutinise statutory instruments. Yet this remains 
a weak device. And in some limited cases, instruments may even be made without any 
draft being laid before Parliament. 
The likely delegation of legislative power away from Parliament raises pressing concerns 
for the accountability and transparency of the new arrangements, strengthening the 
legislative supremacy of the executive. Beyond the ‘sifting committee’ scrutiny, there is no 
proposed requirement on the government to provide explanation, justification or evaluation 
of the impact of their changes made to the law. This approach could compromise legal 
certainty and individual rights, and give government ministers leave to implement policy 
choices without Parliament. For all the intention of ‘taking back control’, such a design will 
be less democratic, create more uncertainty and ultimately weaken Parliament, as power is 
centralised in the hand of very few people in Whitehall.
Will the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice be 
undemocratic post-Brexit?
To a significant extent the main ‘Brexit issues’ will be determined by a Withdrawal 
Agreement with the EU, and not by the UK’s Parliament (or executive) acting alone. These 
issues include questions about the Northern Irish border with the Republic of Ireland; 
the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK and of UK citizens in the EU; Gibraltar; the 
settlement concerning the UK’s remaining financial liabilities to the EU; and of course the 
future terms of trade between the UK and EU. However, these matters are just the headline 
issues so far. Many more issues will need settlement, including cooperation on matters of 
security, crime, family and civil judgments.
A key question has been whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
any jurisdiction in the UK following Brexit. The issue captured headlines following the ‘red 
line’ announced by Theresa May. The CJEU’s function is to ensure the uniform application 
of EU law across all member states. It acts as a final arbiter in the case of disputes that 
fall within its jurisdiction, and provides an authoritative interpretation of EU law to be 
equally applied across all member states.  Asking whether it is democratically legitimate 
to have regard to the jurisdiction of the CJEU is misplaced. In most liberal democracies, 
the judiciary are generally unelected in order to insulate them from the vagaries of day-to-
day politics and to preserve judicial independence. Whether or not the UK will fall under 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU on certain EU-related issues post-Brexit remains part of the 
complex resolution of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, and will depend 
on whether it will be necessary for participation in the single market at least for goods.
Could there be another ‘Miller judgment’?
The 2016 Miller judgment by the UK’s Supreme Court was a powerful statement of the 
centrality of Parliament and the rule of law, above and beyond the powers of the executive. 
Under the judgment, the government alone does not have authority to make law which 
changes or removes domestic rights of individuals. To trigger Article 50, the government 
must be authorised to do so by an Act of Parliament. 
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The key result of Miller was a brief (137-word) Act of Parliament that gave authority to the 
Prime Minister to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU under Article 
50. This Act did not give authority to the Prime Minister to agree to adopt the Withdrawal 
Agreement on behalf of the UK. (From the EU perspective, the Withdrawal Agreement 
would need to be adopted by a qualified majority vote, which requires that it is supported 
by at least 72% of the remaining 27 member states and representing at least 65% of the 
total EU population.) It can therefore be assumed that any withdrawal agreement must also 
be passed by the Westminster Parliament. Not doing so would likely result in Miller 2.0.
However, further questions around the Brexit process concern the immunisation of 
executive power from judicial challenge, and the removal or weakening of individual 
rights, by virtue of how withdrawal is implemented. Both of these concerns are at issue 
in the context of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. It is highly likely there will be 
extensive litigation arising as a result of Brexit. The July 2017 Unison judgment concerning 
the constitutional right to access to justice can also be recognised as a shot across the 
bow from the Supreme Court for future Miller-type litigation. In a searing section of this 
judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed their role in ensuring that the executive carries 
out its functions in accordance with the law, and as regards its view on parliamentary 
democracy, the rule of law, and access to justice:
‘Without such access [to the Courts], laws are liable to become a dead 
letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the 
democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless 
charade.’ (R(Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, at 58 (per Lord 
Reed).
We may guess how the courts will be likely to regard any Brexit process that does not 
respect these fundamental values.
Would a second referendum deliver democratic legitimacy?
The 2016 referendum delivered a result so surprising to all sides that no clear preparations 
had been made for a Leave vote, and subsequent revelations about the Leave campaign’s 
breaches of spending limits and Russian interference in the campaign have both raised 
question marks about the legitimacy of the narrow Leave vote. However, campaigners for 
a second referendum for a long time faced barriers such as whether the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU) would accept a second referendum after Article 50 had been triggered, 
and whether a second vote might not just easily produce another (perhaps larger) Leave 
majority.
However, opinion on the ground has changed and the lack of clarity about what Brexit deal 
will happen, including the continuing possibility of a no deal outcome, have strengthened 
demands for a referendum to confirm or reject the final arrangements. Many people are 
still hoping for the UK to remain a member state of the EU, and for them it may be a case 
of what was done by a referendum can only be undone by a referendum. From an external 
perspective, the question of whether it is possible to ‘un-trigger’ Article 50 is likely to be 
answered as a political rather than a legal question, and EU elites still believe it is likely in 
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the affirmative. However, as the EU institutions and member states commit large time and 
investment in preparation for UK withdrawal, such political will may dissipate.
Critics (including this author) argue that such a referendum is at once too early and too late. 
It is too early for a deal to have been concluded (even in abstract) with the EU-27 which 
can then be put to referendum, and too late for the decision to be determined by the UK 
electorate as negotiations have begun. In practical terms, there is no frame of question 
that could be presented to the electorate that would satisfy all sides and be immune from 
accusations of bias or betrayal. 
From a fundamental constitutional perspective, there should not be a second referendum 
on Brexit – because that would only serve to further undermine the system of 
parliamentary democracy. Unless we accept a radical reformulation of the constitutional 
foundations of the UK, a democratic Brexit process is one that reasserts Parliament’s 
sovereignty over the 2016 referendum, but recognises that this sovereignty extends only to 
the UK borders – while Brexit reaches far, far beyond them.
Conclusions
Brexit has raised a great variety of legal issues and the development of the process has 
had some heartening and some worrying consequences for the UK public’s understanding 
of the role of Parliament and legislation on the one hand, and of judges and the courts on 
the other. Amongst the most worrying have been the pillorying of judges in the media as 
‘enemies of the people’ (an accusation that was not condemned by government ministers, 
and was perhaps even condoned by them), or attacks on the CJEU for a lack of democratic 
legitimacy. Both fundamentally misunderstand the whole notion of an independent 
judiciary, and the central values of the separation of judicial power from the executive and 
legislature and of the rule of law. Similarly virulent attacks on Remain MPs as ‘saboteurs’ 
for exercising judgement on implementation arrangements for Brexit reflect a poor 
understanding of what a legislature is for.
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